The Effects of Prosecutor Turnover on Criminal Case Outcomes
Published in Unpublished Working Paper, 2024
How does election turnover influence prosecutor behavior and the outcomes of criminal cases? This study explores how first-term district attorneys (DAs) adjust case strategies under unique electoral and institutional pressures to build pub- lic credibility, by examining how new prosecutors signal competence to voters through case outcomes, including plea bargains, dismissals, and jury convictions. Employing a dynamic difference-in-difference (DID) approach across three U.S. states, the analysis reveals that prosecutor turnover is associated with an increase in plea bargain convictions as reelection approaches. In contrast to prior research findings, we find that new prosecutors do not significantly increase jury trial con- victions before elections. These findings suggest that new prosecutors’ electoral vulnerability promotes a strategic shift towards risk-averse behavior, prioritizing plea bargains over jury trials to manage caseloads and signal effectiveness. This study expands existing knowledge of how electoral incentives and career concerns shape prosecutor discretion and case outcomes in the criminal justice system.
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